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This factsheet gives answers on how climate exacerbates root causes of conflict in Senegal, using an 
impact pathway analysis. Two main impact pathways are identified: 
1. Livelihood and food insecurity in Matam and Tambacounda: Projected increases in temperatures 
and declines in precipitations are likely to adversely impact existing natural resources and undermine 
climate-sensitive livelihoods in the Eastern provinces of Matam and Tambacounda, incrementing the 
sense of abandonment by the central government and increasing the prospects for the recruitment 
by NSAGs; 
2. Fish scarcity, livelihood insecurity and recruitment by NSAGs: The negative impact of the climate 
crisis on marine ecosystems and fish stocks can compound food insecurity, poverty and unemployment 
of people dependent on the fishing industry, increasing the prospects for the recruitment of NSAGs.
Ignacio Madurga-Lopez, Tanaya Dutta Gupta, Peter Läderach and Grazia Pacillo 
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This publication is part of a factsheet series reporting on the findings of the CGIAR FOCUS Climate 
Security Observatory work in Africa (Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe). 
The research is centered around 5 questions*:  
How does climate exacerbate root causes of conflict? 
Impact pathways 
Kenya   Mali   Nigeria   Senegal   Sudan   Uganda   Zimbabwe
Econometric analysis 
Kenya   Mali   Nigeria   Senegal   Sudan   Uganda   Zimbabwe
Scopus analysis** 
Where are the climate insecurities hotspots? 
Spatial analysis
Kenya   Mali   Nigeria   Senegal   Sudan   Uganda   Zimbabwe
What is the underlying structure of the climate, conflict, 
and socio-economic system? 
Network analysis
Kenya   Mali   Nigeria   Senegal   Sudan   Uganda   Zimbabwe
Are climate and security policies coherent and integrated? 
Policy coherence analysis
Are policy makers aware of the climate security nexus?
Social media analysis
Kenya   Mali   Nigeria   Senegal   Sudan   Uganda   Zimbabwe
Click on the links above to view the other Factsheets 
* Questions 1, 2, 3, 5 are analyzed at country level through a Climate Risk Lens (impact pathways, economic, spatial, network and social 
media analyses). The policy coherence and scopus analyses are at continental level.
**Scopus is one of the largest curated abstract and citation databases, with a wide global and regional coverage of scientific journals, 
conference proceedings, and books. We used Scopus data for analyzing: (1) how global climate research addresses the dynamics 
between climate, socio-economic factors, and conflict, and (2) how the countries studied are represented in the database. 
© 2021 CGIAR FOCUS Climate Security. 
This is an open-access document distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which 
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source 
are credited. 
The views expressed in this document cannot be taken to reflect the official position of the CGIAR or its donor agen-
cies. The designations employed and the presentation of material in this report do not imply the expression of any 
opinion on the part of CGIAR concerning the legal status of any country, territory, area, city or area or of its authorities, 
or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed in this document cannot be taken 
to reflect the official position of the CGIAR or its donor agencies.
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PATHWAY#1:  
Livelihood and food insecurity in Matam and Tambacounda
The Eastern provinces of Matam and Tambacounda are among the poorest and most food-
insecure regions of the country. They are also among the most vulnerable to the effects of the 
climate crisis as most of their population relies on climate-sensitive livelihoods. The climate 
crisis will impact existing natural resources, exacerbating pre-existing vulnerabilities and 
undermining climate-sensitive livelihoods. Livelihood insecurity can, in turn, increment the 
sense of abandonment by the central government, increasing radicalisation and paving the 
way for the recruitment by non-state armed groups (NSAGs).
PATHWAY#2:   
Fish scarcity, livelihood insecurity and recruitment by NSAGs 
Fishery is one of the main industries in Senegal. The climate crisis is contributing to the 
degradation of marine ecosystems and the overall decrease in fish availability, exacerbating 
existing socio-economic vulnerabilities such as food insecurity, poverty, and unemployment of 
the people whose livelihood is linked to the fishing industry. The lack of jobs and alternative 
economic opportunities can increase the recruitment of young Senegalese into NSAGs. 
1. OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The Impact Pathway Analysis (IPA) aims to identify, describe, and represent the complex and non-
linear interactions between climate, conflict, and existing vulnerabilities and risks with a special focus 
on food, land, and water systems. In particular, the IPA intends to address the following questions: 
• What are the potential climate security pathways through which climate may act as a threat 
multiplier? 
• Which specific vulnerabilities and risks, that are at the heart of insecurity and conflict, may be 
exacerbated by the climate crisis? 
• How can dimensions such as natural resources, livelihoods, mobility, governance and food, land, and 
water systems, inform climate security pathways in specific contexts?
2. METHODS AND DATA 
The IPA follows a systematic literature search and review to find, collate, analyze and synthesize insights 
from relevant knowledge products, including reports, policy briefs, fact sheets from grey literature, 
as well as books, journal articles, and other sources of documented evidence in academic literature 
and public media. The construction of a narrative is then followed by consultation with a designated 
set of experts and stakeholders through interviews and written feedback to gather evaluation and 
incorporate suggested revisions. 
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3. RESULTS 
3.1 Climate exposure and vulnerability
Senegal is part of the Sahel, one of the most climate-vulnerable regions in the world. Senegal is highly 
vulnerable to climate disruptions while having a low level of readiness (University of Notre Dame 2019). 
It suffers from both slow and rapid onset events such as droughts, floods, coastal erosion, and sea-
level rise (The World Bank Group 2011). Projections say that climate in Senegal will become more 
erratic and that the country will witness an increase in average temperatures between 1.1 and 1.8°C 
by 2030 (Ministère de l’Environnement et du Développement Durable 2015b). Historical trends show 
a sea-level rise of 1.4mm per year and some projections estimate a rise of up to one meter by 2100. 
While projections agree that heavy rainfall events will increment, there is no consensus on whether 
annual rainfall will increase or decrease (Ministère de l’Environnement et du Développement Durable 
2015a; The World Bank Group 2011). Other extreme weather events such as droughts and floods will 
also increase in frequency (The World Bank Group 2011). These climate stressors are likely to burden 
Senegal’s economy and society which are highly dependent on climate-sensitive sectors such as 
agriculture, livestock, and fisheries that employ more than 70% of the workforce and contribute to 
13.6% of the GDP (Ministère de l’Environnement et du Développement Durable 2015a; 2015b; Jalloh et 
al. 2017). 70% of Senegalese agriculture is rainfed which makes it extremely vulnerable to changes in 
climate (USAID 2017a). Some estimates project that the main crops, including maize, millet, sorghum, 
and groundnuts, will see their yields reduced (USAID 2017a). The livestock sector will also be affected by 
the reduction in the production and quality of fodder due to decreased water availability. This, in turn, 
may threaten the life of the herds and burden meat and milk production (Minstere de l’Environment 
et de la Protection de la Nature 2006).
3.2 Socio-economic and political insecurity  
According to the main peace and security indicators, Senegal is the most peaceful country of the 
Sahel (Institute of Economics & Peace 2021) and one of the most stable in the African continent (The 
Fund For Peace 2020). Since achieving its independence, Senegal has had relatively stable civilian 
governments with peaceful transitions of power (BBC 2018; World Bank 2021). However, it has several 
socio-economic and political vulnerabilities and security risks that could threaten this stability. The 
country has the current longest armed conflict in Africa which, despite having evolved into a low-
intensity war in the last decade, is still a source of instability in southern Senegal. Since 1982 the 
conflict in Casamance has confronted the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC), 
who fights for the independence of the region, and the Senegalese government. The war has resulted 
in 5,000 deaths and thousands of forced migrants and, in the last two decades has been increasingly 
intertwined with illicit economies including timber and cannabis trafficking (Madurga López 2021; 
Foucher 2019).
Despite being one of the few countries in which radical Islamic terrorism is not a salient issue and 
has never suffered a terrorist attack of that nature, in the last few years there has been an incipient 
jihadist activity. Several terrorist groups have tried to expand their influence in Senegal and even tried 
to establish terrorist cells in the province of Tambacounda (Pujol-Mazzini 2018; Counter Extremism 
Project 2020). Other security risks include human trafficking involving smuggling migrants towards 
Europe as well as talibé children that are used for forced labour such as forced begging (Kane 2020b; 
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HRW 2019). Drug trafficking is an increasingly relevant issue with strong implications for security. 
In recent years the trafficking of cocaine coming from Latin America has increased in West Africa – 
including Senegal – taking advantage of its geography and the freedom of cross-border movement 
among the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) countries (Bird 2021; Kane 2020a).
Poverty is a serious concern among Senegal’s socio-economic insecurities. 43% of the people are poor 
in urban areas and 58% in rural areas. This shows a noticeable inequality between rural and urban 
areas that can also be seen in food security rates. A total of 8% of urban households suffer from food 
insecurity while around 15% of the rural households are food insecure. Without any adaptation policies, 
climate change and variability may exacerbate these issues, leading to environmental degradation, 
natural resource scarcity, and even conflict  (National Agency for Civil Aviation and Meteorology of 
Senegal (ANACIM) et al. 2013).
3.3 Climate security pathways 
The combined effect of a rise in temperatures and rainfall variability linked to the climate crisis is 
likely to increase droughts, undermine agricultural production and productivity, and increase poverty 
and food insecurity (USAID 2011; Ministère de l’Environnement et du Développement Durable 2015b; 
Minstere de l’Environment et de la Protection de la Nature 2006). These impacts of climate on 
existing socio-economic vulnerabilities could exacerbate existing risks and tensions and contribute to 
instability and insecurity through multiple pathways (Figure 1).
PATHWAY #1: Livelihood and food insecurity in Matam and Tambacounda
The Eastern provinces of Matam and Tambacounda are two of the main peripheral regions which, 
distant from the capital and the main coastal urban centres, have been historically marginalised 
during colonial and post-colonial times (Ninot 2003; Grechi and Agustoni 2019; Sakho 2005). They 
are both among the poorest regions of the country with all of its departments having poverty rates 
higher than 50%, including in Ranérou, the department with the highest poverty rate in Senegal 
(94%). Food insecurity is also present in both provinces with 10 to 21% of the households being food 
insecure (National Agency for Civil Aviation and Meteorology of Senegal (ANACIM) et al. 2013).
Other local vulnerabilities include the lack of access to markets, youth unemployment, youth 
disaffection, lack of access to natural resources, and rising disputes between farmers and herders. A 
visible outcome of these dynamics is the migration towards the main urban centres of the country 
as well as the increasing number of people – especially youth – engaging in illicit activities such 
as poaching, drug and human trafficking, and banditry (National Agency for Civil Aviation and 
Meteorology of Senegal (ANACIM) et al. 2013; USAID 2017b). Matam and Tambacounda are particularly 
vulnerable to the threat of Islamic radicalism and there is a risk of violent extremism (USAID 2017b). 
Several terrorist groups have tried to expand their influence in Senegal and even tried to establish 
terrorist cells in the province of Tambacounda (Counter Extremism Project 2020; Pujol-Mazzini 
2018; Chair of the Security Council Committee 2021). Some jihadist groups such as Ansar Dine have 
reportedly recruited Senegalese people for their operations in Mali (Moniquet 2013). The expansion of 
Salafism since the 1990s with the growing influence of Saudi-funded associations and mosques is an 
important factor to consider. While Salafism is a very heterogeneous movement, its political version 
is linked to militant jihad that goes against Senegalese secular and peaceful values. Even if Salafism 
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Figure 1: Climate Security Pathways for Senegal
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still does not have a large influence in Senegal, there have been already some issues such as the 
imprisonment of 15 imams for preaching Islamist propaganda or the enrolment of many Senegalese 
in international terrorist groups (Volk 2017).
At the same time, Matam and Tambacounda are among the most vulnerable provinces of Senegal with 
most of its population relying on climate-sensitive livelihoods such as agriculture, livestock, fishing, 
and mining1 which are already being affected by changes in climate. These regions are suffering from 
rainfall variability and dry spells, climate stressors that are projected to increase (USAID 2017a; National 
Agency for Civil Aviation and Meteorology of Senegal (ANACIM) et al. 2013; FAO 2016). The increase in 
temperatures is estimated to be faster in interior regions with some studies estimating an increase 
of 2°C in annual mean temperature in Matam and Tambacounda by 2050 which may result in more 
severe droughts (CIAT and BFS/USAID 2016; National Agency for Civil Aviation and Meteorology of 
Senegal (ANACIM) et al. 2013) Estimates predict a 9.2% and a 10% decrease in average precipitation in 
Tambacounda and Matam by 2050 (CIAT and BFS/USAID 2016).
The climate crisis will impact existing natural resources in Matam and Tambacounda which are 
already stressed by poor management practices, increasing competition over resources, and the 
politicization of land allocation. Altogether, these factors can undermine climate-sensitive livelihoods 
due to the reduced availability of resources which can compound pre-existing socio-economic and 
political inequalities, vulnerabilities, and risks such as food insecurity, poverty, unemployment, and 
the competition over the access and use of natural resources (USAID 2017b). The scarcity of natural 
resources and the livelihood insecurity may therefore contribute to insecurity, incrementing conflicts 
between farmer and pastoralist communities, and increase people’s involvement in illicit activities 
such as poaching, trafficking, and banditry (USAID 2017b). Livelihood insecurity and more pronounced 
socio-economic and political vulnerabilities can increment the sense of abandonment by the central 
government, increasing radicalisation – especially among the youth – and paving the way for the 
recruitment of non-state armed groups which is mainly driven by unemployment and poverty (Sambe 
et al. 2016; Sambe et al. 2021; Sakor 2020; Nett and Rüttinger 2016; USAID 2017b; UNDP 2017).
PATHWAY #2: Fish scarcity, livelihood insecurity and recruitment by NSAGs  
Fishery is one of the main industries in Senegal, employing around 17% of the workforce, accounting 
for 1.8% of the GDP and 32% of the exports and representing 62% of the protein intake of the population 
(Heck and Béné 2005; USAID 2017a). In the last decades, the fishing industry has suffered an acute crisis 
also witnessed in other parts of the world which have reduced the contribution of fishery to the GDP 
from an average of 2.2% in the 1990s to an average of 1.8% in the 2000s (Ministère de l’Environnement 
et du Développement Durable 2015b). The crisis has been linked to the reduction in fish stocks that 
are mainly linked to the problem of overfishing caused by extensive fishing of foreign vessels as well 
as illegal fishing and pollution which contribute to the degradation of maritime ecosystems (Faye 
2011; Standing 2015; USAID 2009; 2017b; Blédé et al. 2015).
1 Changes in climate may have both direct and indirect impacts on mining, including the modification of water resources due to 
droughts which are essential for mining operations (Rüttinger and Sharma 2016)
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The climate crisis is also contributing to the reduction of fish stocks. Changes in climate have been 
observed in past decades, including a rise of 0.04 to 0.05°C in water temperatures between 1980 and 
2009 as well as a progressive increase in water salinity in the coastal areas (Ministère de l’Environnement 
et du Développement Durable 2015a). Current estimates highlight that this trend is likely to continue 
in the future including also a rise in the acidification of the ocean (USAID 2017a; World Bank 2013). 
Altogether, these changes in climate are likely to critically alter the environment of marine fauna, 
reducing productivity and altering the distribution, reproduction, and migration of the species which 
would further reduce fish stocks (World Bank 2013; USAID 2017a; Ministère de l’Environnement et de 
la Protection de la Nature 2010). As a consequence, some estimations for West Africa project that 
50% of the jobs related to the fishing industry will be lost by 2050 due to climate change, impacting 
livelihoods, purchasing power, and food security in the region (Belhabib et al. 2016).
The climate crisis will therefore contribute to the degradation of marine ecosystems and the 
overall decrease in fish availability, exacerbating existing socio-economic vulnerabilities such as 
food insecurity, poverty, and unemployment of the people whose livelihood is linked to the fishing 
industry. The restrictions and closing of borders due to the COVID-19 pandemic have additionally 
affected people working in fisheries (Lawal 2021). The lack of job opportunities in the coastal areas 
forces people to migrate to other countries in search of livelihood and work opportunities (Adepoju 
2003; Jönsson and Kamali 2012; Cross 2009; Sall and Morand 2008). 
Furthermore, the lack of economic opportunities, considered a driving factor in the recruitment of 
NSAGs (UNDP 2017; Nett and Rüttinger 2016), has been identified as a main driver in the recruitment 
of the young Senegalese coastal city of Dakar. A study from the Timbuktu Institute highlighted that 
lack of employment opportunities and poverty are considered the two main drivers of the enlistment 
of the Senegalese youth in jihadist groups (Sambe et al. 2016). Hence, the impact of climate change 
on fish stocks may exacerbate those socio-economic vulnerabilities and increase livelihood insecurity, 
incrementing prospects for the recruitment of NSAGs in coastal cities.
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